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Abstract
We test the eectiveness of self-help peer groups as a commitment device for pre-
cautionary savings, through two randomized eld experiments among 2,687 Chilean
micro-entrepreneurs. The rst experiment nds that self-help peer groups are a
powerful tool to increase savings (the number of deposits grows 3.7-fold and the
average savings balance almost doubles). In contrast, a more classical measure, a
substantially increased interest rate, has no eect for most participants. A second
experiment tests an alternative delivery mechanism and shows that eects of similar
size can be achieved by holding people accountable through feedback text messages,
without meetings or peer pressure.
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11 Introduction
While commitment devices such as defaults and direct deposits from wages into savings
accounts have been found to be highly eective to increase savings (e.g. Madrian and
Shea, 2001; Carroll et al., 2009; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004), most of these mechanisms
are out of reach for large segments of the world's population, since they depend crucially
on the existence of a formal wage bill. This is particularly problematic in developing
countries, where many work as low-income micro-entrepreneurs or in the informal sector,
but also aects independent entrepreneurs and the unemployed in the developed world.
This paper investigates the eectiveness of an alternative mechanism that is poten-
tially available to anyone: peers as a commitment device. In fact, the use of peers as
a commitment device to reach a shared but individual goal is a widely observed phe-
nomenon, both informally (e.g., running groups or study groups) and formally (e.g., Al-
coholics Anonymous (AA) or weight-loss groups).1 While self-help peer groups have been
subject to theoretical analysis (e.g. Schelling, 1984; Battaglini et al., 2005), to our knowl-
edge there exists no clean evidence investigating whether they actually help participants
achieve their goals and if so, what aspects make them eective.
We conducted two randomized eld experiments among low-income micro-
entrepreneurs in Chile to study the power of self-help peer groups as a commitment
device for precautionary savings. Our rst experiment, the \Peer Group Experiment,"
shows that self-help peer groups have a strong impact on savings. We oered 2,687
micro-entrepreneurs, who met regularly as members of a microcredit association, the op-
portunity to open a formal savings account. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
three conditions: 1) a control condition where individuals only received the basic account,
2) a Self-Help Peer Group Treatment where participants additionally had the option to
publicly announce their savings commitment, which was then monitored in the weekly
meetings; and 3) a High Interest Rate Treatment with a 5% real interest rate instead of
the 0.3% in the basic account, which served as a benchmark to measure the eectiveness
of the Peer Group Treatment.
Participants assigned to the Peer Group Treatment deposit 3.7 times as often into the
savings account and their average savings balance is almost twice that of the control group.
1For example, AA has more than 2m members world-wide, 1.3 of them in the US
(www.aa.org), and each week an average of 1.3m participants attend a Weight Watchers meeting
(www.weightwatchersinternational.com).
2The Treatment-on-the-Treated eect on the total amount deposited of 25,900 Chilean
pesos (about 45 USD) represents about 32% of mean monthly income and corresponds in
size to the type of expenditures participants had expressed wanting to build a buer stock
for, such as unexpected doctor's visits and payments for heating, electricity or food during
periods of short-term income uctuation.2 Correspondingly, participants in the peer group
treatment were subsequently signicantly less anxious about their nancial future (Kast
and Pomeranz, 2013), consistent with other studies showing that even relatively small
amounts of savings can make a substantial dierence (e.g., Burgess and Pande, 2005;
Brune et al., 2011; Ashraf et al., 2010; Dupas and Robinson, 2013b,a).
In contrast to the eect of the Peer Group Treatment, the strongly increased interest
rate has a surprisingly small eect, even though it was made exceptionally salient. While
average savings increase somewhat, suggesting by linear extrapolation that the eect
of self-help peer groups would correspond to an interest rate increase of at least 7.8
percentage points, quantile analysis reveals that the vast majority of participants do not
respond to the interest rate at all, neither in terms of amount saved nor by reallocating
savings from pre-existing accounts to the newly oered high interest rate account.
Our second \Feedback Message Experiment" was conducted one year after the open-
ing of the accounts and was designed to distinguish some of the mechanism behind the
eectiveness of self-help peer groups. Such group meetings always consist of a bundle
of dierent, potentially important elements: being observed by others or peer pressure,
observing the behavior of others, regular feedback and holding participants accountable
for following through with their goals, goal setting, rewards, etc. The Feedback Message
Experiment strips the treatment of many of these aspects in order to get more information
about what might be driving the eect. Participants were assigned to one of two types of
weekly feedback text messages, or to a control group. Even though the ndings from two
separate experiments cannot be directly compared, the results suggest that holding people
accountable through the weekly feedback messages increases savings almost as much as
self-help peer groups { even without any physical meetings.
In addition to the regular feedback and follow-up, we distinguished one treatment
that includes the aspect of peer pressure { others observing the performance of the partici-
pant (Schelling, 1984) { from a second treatment that includes the aspect of observing the
2While large amounts of savings would be suboptimal for a population that is borrowing at the same
time, this type of precautionary savings is valuable at any level of debt, because of the dierent liquidity
of savings and loans (Zinman, 2007).
3performance of others (Battaglini et al., 2005). Surprisingly, we nd that the feedback
message coupled with peer pressure by a real-life \Savings Buddy", who was regularly
informed about the performance of the participant, has no larger eect than the feedback
message that simply informs participants of their own achievement and the success rate
of other participants. These results suggest that while peer groups can provide a highly
eective commitment device, neither in-person meetings nor peer pressure are indispens-
able features, and regular accountability and follow-up play an important role. Modern
technology { in the form of text messages or other feedback devices { has the poten-
tial to render the accountability mechanism of self-help peer groups more scalable and
potentially more attractive to larger and dierent populations.
This paper makes contributions in three areas. First, it speaks to the literature on
commitment devices for saving. While much of the literature on savings commitment
devices in developed countries has studied deposit commitment devices (e.g., Madrian
and Shea, 2001; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Carroll et al., 2009), most of the literature
on developing countries has focused on withdrawal commitment devices (see, e.g., Ashraf
et al., 2006b; Brune et al., 2011, and Bryan et al., 2010 for a review article). With the
notable exception of Ashraf et al. (2006a), who study the determinants of take-up for
deposit collectors in the Philippines, our paper provides one of the rst analyses of the
eectiveness of a deposit commitment device for developing countries. Roscas (Gugerty,
2007; Dupas and Robinson, 2013b) are an interesting hybrid case. Their strict deposit
and withdrawal schedule generates both a deposit and withdrawal commitment device,
and during dierent phases of the cycle, they function as a savings- and later a credit-
vehicle. Deposit commitment devices with liquid accounts are particularly important for
precautionary savings, since in contrast to withdrawal commitment devices, the savings
are always available in times of need. This limits the risk that the commitment device
creates welfare losses if an emergency arises. This paper demonstrates the eectiveness
of a deposit commitment device that does not rely on a formal wage bill, and is there-
fore available to those working in the informal sector, the unemployed, or independent
entrepreneurs.
Second, this paper provides evidence on the role of self-help peer groups as a com-
mitment device more generally. Peer eects have been widely shown to aect behavior,
for example with respect to productivity at work (e.g., Falk and Ichino, 2005; Mas and
Moretti, 2009; Bandiera et al., 2010), alcohol consumption (e.g., Kremer and Levy, 2008),
and nancial decision-making (e.g, Duo and Saez, 2002, 2003; Bursztyn et al., 2012).
4Individuals can use these eects strategically to overcome self-control problems by joining
self-help peer groups as a commitment device. Despite the large prevalence of self-help
peer groups as commitment device in many domains, there is surprisingly little evidence
evaluating their eectiveness.3 Our ndings show that self-help peer groups can provide a
way in which individuals can leverage their peers to support them towards an individual
but mutually shared goal. After having found an eective policy to increase precaution-
ary savings, it is helpful to understand what mechanism might be driving the result,
in order to gain a better understanding about how the policy might be implemented or
scaled most eectively (Ludwig et al., 2011). The Feedback Message Experiment takes
a step in that direction. It starts to unbundle some of the mechanisms and at the same
time provides an alternative delivery mechanism of the service provided by peer group
meetings, that proves to be almost as eective. Combined with evidence that information
about the savings behavior of peers has only limited eects (Beshears et al., 2009)4 and
that even simple regular reminders can increase savings (Karlan et al., 2010)5, the results
suggest that the regular feedback and follow-up could be more important to the success
of self-help peer groups than the peers themselves.
Third, the results on the interest rate contribute to the discussion of the relative
impact of `social' or behavioral versus monetary incentives (e.g. Bertrand et al., 2010;
Ashraf et al., 2012; Chetty et al., 2013). The nding that the interest rate has limited
eectiveness for most individuals ts into a larger pattern of evidence showing the relative
eectiveness of social incentives versus monetary rewards for behavioral change (Gneezy
et al., 2011). In addition of serving as a benchmark for the eect of peer groups, the high
interest rate treatment is interesting in itself as it provides one of the rst experimental
tests estimating the eect of interest rate on savings (Schaner (2011) and Karlan and
Zinman (2013) also provide experimental evidence on the eect of interest rates on savings
3 Walsh et al. (1991) compare the eect of AA meetings to a hospital treatment. The eect of AA
meetings per se is not tested, however. Jebb et al. (2011) show that a commercial Weight Watchers (WW)
program is more eective than a standard program of care for obese individuals.
4The evidence on peer information is in general mixed. While positive eects have been found in some
domains, such as electricity usage when bundled with tips to save energy (Ayres et al., 2012; Allcott,
2011) or contributions to public goods (e.g., Frey and Meier, 2004; Chen et al., 2010; DellaVigna et al.,
2012), peer information has been shown to reduce work eort (Barankay, 2010) or lower take-up of tax
credits (Manoli and Bhargava, 2011). For a discussion in psychology about the ambiguous eects of peer
information, see Schultz et al. (2007).
5Reminders have also been found to be eective in other areas, for example to decrease overdraft bank
fees (Stango and Zinman, 2011), or to improve books returns to the library (Apesteguia et al., 2013),
repayment of loans (Cadena and Schoar, 2011), goal achievement in the workplace (Cadena et al., 2011),
and vaccination rates (Milkman et al., 2011).
5and Mills et al. (2008), Engelhardt and Kumar (2009) and Duo et al. (2006) analyze
the eect of matching contributions to individual savings plans). Our nding that a large
majority of participants do not increase savings when interest rates are substantially
higher, and do not adjust their savings portfolio towards the higher return account, has
implications for the literature on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and for
models and policies based on individuals' responsiveness to the interest rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents set-up and
design of both eld experiments. Section 3 and 4 show the results of the Peer Group
Experiment and the Feedback Message Experiment respectively. Section 5 compares the
Peer Group Treatment with the High Interest Rate Treatment. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background, Data, and Design of Experiments
2.1 Background and Data
Both randomized eld experiments for this study were conducted in collaboration with
the micronance institution Fondo Esperanza (FE), and a large commercial bank, Banco
Credichile. The context of FE is particularly suitable to analyze the role of self-help
peer groups as a savings commitment device for those outside the formal labor market.
The study participants were members of FE, and the savings accounts that were oered
were held with Banco Credichile. Members of FE are self-employed micro-entrepreneurs
(e.g., street vendors, cosmetic saleswomen), many of whom work in the informal sector.
Participants are typically from the same geographic area, but do not work together, as
each has their own micro-entreprise. They meet regularly, on a weekly or biweekly basis,
in groups of about 10-20 peers, together with a group supervisor from FE. The purpose
of the meetings is to enforce the regular repayment of the micro-loans that participants
receive from FE in 3-month cycles for investment in their micro-enterprise. This feature
allowed us to incorporate the peer group-based commitment structure.
Members expressed substantial desire to increase their savings. Sixty-nine percent
said they frequently regret not having saved more. In focus groups conducted before
the intervention,6 many mentioned the goal of building savings as a buer stock for
emergencies. The main reason why they were looking to build savings, while borrowing
6The groups that participated in the focus groups were not included in the randomized evaluation.
6at the same time from the micronance organization, is the dierence in liquidity (see
also Zinman, 2007). The rigid schedule of the micro-loans renders them unsuitable to
cover irregular or unexpected nancial needs (Karlan and Mullainathan, 2009). However,
given this precautionary motive, the optimal amounts of savings can be expected to be
low, since for amounts beyond what is necessary for short-term smoothing, it would be
more benecial to reduce the amount of debt rst.
This paper draws on three dierent sources of data. First, information on take-up and
all transactions in the accounts was obtained directly from Banco Credichile. The second
source of data came from FE's administrative les, which include participants' estimated
household size, income, and years of education. Unfortunately, data on loan size or default
rates was not available. Finally, we complemented these two sources of administrative
data with an extensive baseline and follow-up survey, conducted by the independent
survey agency Microdatos. These surveys include questions about participants' savings
and debt, their economic situation and recent economic diculties, as well as a number
of questions about individuals' preferences and self-assessment, such as attitudes towards
savings and banks, nancial literacy, time preferences, etc.
The timeline of the interventions was as follows (see Figure 1 for an illustration): The
baseline survey was conducted in April-May 2008, during one of the group meetings. The
savings accounts for the Peer Group Experiment were introduced soon after, in June-July
2008. A year later, the follow-up survey was conducted through individual interviews
at participants' home or workplace, to be able to cover all participants, including those
that had left FE in the meantime. During this follow-up survey, eligible participants were
introduced to the second experiment, the Feedback Message Experiment.
[Figure 1 about here.]
2.2 Experiment 1: Self-Help Peer Groups and Interest Rate
Design
The Peer Group Experiment analyzes the eect of self-help peer groups on savings
and was conducted among 196 groups with a total of 2,687 members of the micronance
organization Fondo Esperanza (FE). The universe of study participants consists of all
members of the 196 groups who were present in the meeting when the baseline survey
was conducted.
7In the weeks following the baseline survey, one of three types of savings accounts
was introduced to the groups (see below). Groups were randomly assigned to either the
control group or one of two treatment accounts. All members within a group were oered
the same type of account, without learning of the existence of other accounts (see Figure 1
for a graphical representation of the experimental design).
The randomization was stratied by group supervisor, which automatically led to
balance by region as well. Half of the groups were randomly selected for the self-help
peer group account, while the rest were assigned to the high-interest rate and the basic
account in equal proportion.7 The accounts had the following features:
1. The basic savings account (control group) had a real annual interest rate of 0.3%
(similar to the highest standard alternative in the Chilean market). It was attractive
compared to other options in the market in that it had no maintenance fee and no
minimum balance, except for a 2-dollar minimum opening deposit. The account
was completely liquid for withdrawals at any time, and the nancial conditions
were guaranteed for at least two years.
2. The self-help peer group account was identical to the basic account, but was ac-
companied by an accountability structure, in which the weekly meetings acted as a
self-help peer group in the following way: group members had the option of publicly
announcing to the group what their weekly savings goal was for the coming three
months. Subsequently, members veried in each group meeting who had complied
with their savings goal. Those who complied, and showed a deposit slip as proof,
received a sticker in a booklet, and those who collected enough stickers received a
diploma as a non-monetary award. There were no nancial incentives for complying
with one's goal.
3. The high-interest account was identical to the basic account, but oered a 5% real in-
terest rate. It was explicitly presented as the \Best Option in the Market"-Account,
and when the account was introduced, its high return was illustrated graphically
and with great care by their FE group leader during a one-hour workshop in the
weekly meeting, which included the visualization of a growing piggy-bank and an
illustration of compounded interest rates.
7The design also included a pure control group that received no savings account, used for an impact
evaluation of access to a formal savings account (discussed in Kast and Pomeranz, 2013).
8Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the 2,687 participants in the sample of the
Peer Group Experiment. As expected given the random assignment, average characteris-
tics in the three treatment groups are very similar and there are no statistically signicant
dierences, with the exception of group size.
[Table 1 about here.]
Participants in the study are an average of 43 years old and have a mean of 9.7 years
of schooling. Monthly income per capita of their households is 80,519 pesos (about 160
USD), with an average household size of 4.3 people. Sixty-seven percent of participants
did not have a savings account prior to the study.8 Correspondingly, the median of pre-
existing savings was zero, with a mean of 68,980 pesos (while income is expressed in per
capita terms, these savings may combine savings of several household members, especially
including participants' children). Participants' reported mean debt, including the micro-
loan from FE, is 287,326 pesos, with a median of 66,000 pesos. The larger amounts of
debt compared to savings is not surprising given that participants are entrepreneurs and
most of their debt is backed up by inventories and future sales.
The average number of participants was 15 per group, with a slightly lower average in
groups oered the basic savings account.9 For the questions about participants' attitudes
and preferences, we conducted an F-test, which clearly rejects the null hypothesis that
they are jointly signicant in predicting whether a group had been assigned to a basic
account or one of the other two accounts.
2.3 Experiment 2: Feedback Messages
Design
Since the Peer Group Treatment consists of a whole bundle of dierent, potentially
important elements, the goal of the Feedback Message Experiment is to strip the treat-
ment of most of these aspects. It keeps many things constant, in order to advance our
understanding of what drives the eect and investigate an alternative, potentially more
scalable delivery mechanism.
8In Chile in general, 40% do not have a bank account (Demirg u c-Kunt et al., 2008, p. 190).
9The baseline survey was conducted before it was determined, which groups were going to be assigned
to which treatment, so we can exclude a selection eect based on the type of the account.
9This experiment was conducted one year later, during the follow-up survey, among
873 participants who had opened an account in the scope of the intervention (see Figure 1).
Eligible participants were randomly assigned to either the control group, or one of two
weekly text message services designed to simulate the regular feedback and follow-up of
peer group meetings. The research team matched weekly transaction data from the bank
with individuals in the study, and sent corresponding messages to the participants. If
participants had made a deposit, the text message congratulated them for doing so. If
they had missed it, the text message alerted them to that fact.
Peer groups are often thought to aect behavior by creating pressure on individuals.
Reneging on one's commitment can be punished directly or can negatively aect a person's
reputation or image (e.g. Schelling, 1984).10 Alternatively, Battaglini et al. (2005) suggest
that participants of self-help peer groups may be motivated by observing the success of
others, which leads them to update their belief about their own ability to follow through
with the shared goal. In addition to the regular feedback, one treatment therefore included
the aspect of peer pressure { others observing the success rate of the participant { while
the second treatment included the aspect of the participant observing the success rate of
others.
1. Peer Pressure Treatment: Participants set a weekly savings goal for themselves.
They then chose a person as their \Savings Buddy" to monitor their performance
and encourage them to stick to their goal. Both the participant and the Savings
Buddy subsequently received weekly text messages, informing them whether the
participant did or did not make their deposit that week. The message sent to par-
ticipants also reminded them that the Savings Buddy received the same information.
The text message to the Savings Buddies also thanked them for being the partici-
pant's Savings Buddy (see the Appendix A for exact wording of the messages).
2. Peer Information Treatment: In the same way as in the Peer Pressure Treatment,
participants set a weekly savings goal for themselves and received a weekly text
message, informing them whether they made their weekly deposit. However, no one
else could observe the participant's performance and there was no Savings Buddy
exerting pressure. Instead, participants were told what share of other participants
similar to them made their weekly deposit.11
10For a similar argument about norm adherence, see, e.g., Bernheim (1994) and for image motivation,
see Benabou and Tirole (2006); Ariely et al. (2009).
11The design of the Peer Information Treatment in principle also allowed analyzing the impact of
103. Control Group: Participants are only asked to set a weekly savings goal for them-
selves, but are not oered any text-message service.
Sample Selection and Set-Up of the Intervention
Prior to administering the follow-up survey, all participants who opened a savings
account during the rst experiment were randomly assigned to one of the three treatment
groups for the second experiment. The randomization was stratied by savings balance
in the study account and by the group to which participants belonged. The latter auto-
matically assures stratication by treatment in the rst experiment. In order to maximize
take-up, a set of screening questions was asked during the survey, to determine who re-
mained in this study. Only those 873 participants who had a cell phone (89.6% of the
total) and were interested in a weekly text message service designed to help people reach
their savings goals (80.2% of participants with cell phones) were included in the Feedback
Message Experiment.
All participants, including the control group, were asked what their weekly savings
goal would be for the next three months if such a service were oered. Because this
question was asked prior to the assignment of treatment and worded exactly the same
regardless of treatment, we can rule out that the eect is driven by the process of goal-
setting itself (see e.g., Locke and Latham, 2006; Hsiaw, 2013). Those assigned to one
of the treatments were then informed that they could indeed receive such a service for
free, and the details of their particular service were explained (without mention of the
existence of other treatments). Since the interviews happened in a staggered manner,
dierent participants started receiving the service at dierent points in time. However,
the service ended for everyone at the same time (at the end of October 2009).
Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the Feedback Message Experiment. As ex-
pected given the random assignment, average characteristics across treatment groups are
very similar.
varying quality of peers, by introducing random variation in which peers participants were compared to.
We assigned participants to four `comparison' groups in order to create random variation in peer quality.
This makes it possible to test whether participants who are informed about a dierent level of success of
their peers in their rst week of treatment display a dierent deposit pattern thereafter. However, power
limitations did not allow distinguishing such dierential treatment eects.
11[Table 2 about here.]
Similar to the Peer Group Experiment, participants have an average of 9.7 years of
schooling, their mean age is 44 years, and 67% did not have a savings account prior to the
account they opened in the context of this study. The mean monthly per capita income
of participants' households is 82,590 Chilean pesos (about 165 USD), with a median of
70,000 pesos. The average number of household members is 4.4. The average savings
balance in the study accounts at the beginning of the Feedback Message Experiment is
12,733 pesos and participants made an average of 1.51 deposits and 0.69 withdrawals
during the 12 months preceding the Feedback Message Experiment.
3 The Eect of Self-Help Peer Groups on Savings
This section analyzes the eect of the Peer Group Treatment, which tests the eect on
savings of self-help peer group meetings, compared to the control group, which was oered
a savings account with no accountability structure. Figure 2 shows the eect of self-help
groups on the monthly number of deposits and average savings balance. It displays the
Intent-To-Treat (ITT) eect for 12 months starting in August 2008, after the opening
period of the accounts (June-July 2008). It compares those assigned to the Peer Group
Treatment to those assigned to the basic account. The self-help peer groups clearly
increase the savings outcomes. Panel A shows that the number of deposits is almost four
times higher in the Peer Group Treatment. While the eect strongly decreases over time,
even in the last quarter of the year, the number of deposits is still over three times higher
(0.059 vs. 0.016; p < 0:001).
[Figure 2 about here]
Panel B of Figure 2 shows that self-help peer groups not only increase the number of
deposits but also lead to higher savings balances. The average balance is twice as high for
participants in the Peer Group Treatment as in the control group. The eect persists over
time and does not decrease during the entire year. The fact that savings increase initially
and stay constant afterwards suggests that individuals may have reached a stable level
of savings that they maintain, consistent with a precautionary savings model. Before
12building any savings beyond a small buer stock, it would be in their interest to rst
reduce their debt.
The decrease in the number of deposits over time might also be explained by at least
two other reasons. First, individuals might not continuously participate in the self-help
peer groups, for example if they leave FE. Secondly, the FE group leader might lose
some of the initial motivation, and the quality and regularity of the self-help peer group
follow-up in the meetings might consequently decline over time. Answers to corresponding
questions from our follow-up survey suggest that all of the above seem to be happening
to some degree. Individuals in the Peer Group Treatment who are still with FE one year
after the introduction of the accounts make more deposits until the end, in groups in
which the leader implemented the treatment more judiciously, the treatment eect stays
higher for longer. However, these correlations have to be interpreted with caution, since
they are not exogenously identied and very prone to selection eects.
Table 3 shows these results in an OLS framework.12 We estimate regressions of the
following specication:
Si =  + 1Self Helpi + 2Interest Ratei + i (1)
Si is the savings outcome for individual i. We analyze three savings outcomes, start-
ing in August 2008: (1) the number of deposits over 12 months, (2) the total amount
deposited, and (3) the average monthly balance. In order to illustrate the eect of out-
liers, we also show the results for a sample that is winsorized at top 1% and top 5%.13
Self Help is a dummy equal to one for individuals in the Peer Group Treatment and
Interest Rate is a dummy equal to one for those in the High-Interest Treatment.  is
the error term. This section focuses on the analysis for the Peer Group Treatment, com-
pared to the basic account. Section 5, below, compares these eects to the results for the
High-Interest Treatment as a benchmark.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the ITT eect for all three outcomes. The ITT eects
support the ndings of Figure 2: the number of deposits, the amount deposited, and the
savings balance are signicantly higher for those in the Peer Group Treatment. Panel
12Tobit specications do not change the results qualitatively.
13The winzorized dataset sets the top 1% and 5% of the observations, respectively, to the 99th and
95th percentile value using the entire dataset, including the period of the rst and second experiment
combined.
13B shows Treatment-on-the-Treated (TOT) eects. Take-up rates of the savings accounts
are very similar across the three treatments. 49.7% of participants opened an account
among those oered the basic account, 54.7% among those oered the self-help peer group
account, and 50.7% among those oered the high-interest rate account (the dierences
are not statistically signicant). Correspondingly, Panel B shows that the TOT eects
are about twice the size of the ITT eects.
[Table 3 about here.]
These eects are both statistically and economically signicant, as the number of
deposits increases 6-fold and average savings balances almost triple.14 The increase in the
balance of 7,400 pesos (approximately 15 USD) represents about 9% of mean monthly
income and corresponds in size to the precautionary savings goal of these accounts.
In sum, the evidence indicates that the self-help peer groups are eective in en-
couraging deposits, which in turn leads to substantially increased savings balances. The
increased number of deposits is not oset by a corresponding increase in withdrawals, even
though the accounts are fully liquid and withdrawals are not observable by the peers.
Are These Real Additional Savings?
Having found that self-help peer groups double savings in the study account, it is
important to ask whether this constitutes additional savings or just crowds out other
forms of savings. Generally, it is very dicult to obtain evidence on this question, since
researchers usually only have information about one savings vehicle, and survey data on
total savings tends to be very noisy. Keeping this caveat in mind, most previous studies
that tested for this found no evidence of crowd-out, or even some evidence for crowding
in (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2006b; Dupas and Robinson, 2013b,a; Gelber, 2011; Prina, 2012). In
line with our results, Chetty et al. (2013) nd that nudges such as automatic contributions
by employers do not crowd out retirement savings. In contrast, a tax subsidy as a nancial
incentive for savings crowds out other savings almost one-to-one.
14Evidence from e.g. Ashraf et al. (2006b) and Meier and Sprenger (2010) suggests that individuals
who exhibit time-inconsistent preferences might benet particularly from nancial commitment devices.
In our context, peer groups lead to front-loading of the cost of not saving, which may have a particularly
strong eect on those with time-inconsistent preferences. Table C1 in the Appendix explores dierential
treatment eects along this category, and the evidence indeed suggests that the treatment might be
particularly eective for those with time-inconsistent preferences.
14Consistent with these previous ndings, our sources of evidence suggest that the self-
help peer groups increase total savings and do not just replace other forms of savings.
First, we measure the impact on other forms of savings based on detailed information from
the baseline and follow-up surveys about participants' other forms of formal and informal
savings.15 This data does not show any indication of crowd-out. However, the data on
self-reported savings amounts is very noisy and does not allow for strong conclusions.16
Anticipating the noisiness of self-reported amounts, we also elicited a binary measure,
where participants indicated whether they made deposits or withdrawals from any other
account in the previous six months. This measure is much less noisy, since it is easier
for participants to remember than exact amounts of the balance.17 Analyzing this binary
measure conrms that those in the Peer Group Treatment are not less likely to use other
accounts than those in the control group, both in terms of deposits and withdrawals.
A second indicator that the savings account in the study has real impacts and does
not only replace other savings stems from evidence in Kast and Pomeranz (2013). This pa-
per analyzes the impact of access to any of the study accounts (i.e. basic, peer group, and
high interest) compared to a control group, which was not oered any account. The anal-
ysis shows that having access to the study account helps participants alleviate the burden
of economic shocks, both objectively and subjectively. After one year, participants with
access to the study accounts have 25% fewer outstanding payments to service providers
(p < 0:01) and 37% fewer outstanding payments to family and friends (p < 0:05). Fur-
thermore, their need to cut back consumption in times of economic diculty is reduced
by 44% (p < 0:05). Subjectively, they report being signicantly less anxious about their
nancial future, and evaluate their recent economic situation as less severe. The magni-
tudes of these subjective improvements correspond in size to more than half of the change
in these measures associated with a job loss or severe business downturn. The study
lacks the statistical power to make very precise statements about the impact of the Peer
Group Treatment compared to the other two accounts. However, it does nd that the
improvements in anxiety about the nancial future are signicantly stronger (p < 0:05)
15For the 67% of participants that did not have another savings account, savings in the study account
represents all new formal savings.
16To get a sense of how noisy the self-reported information is, we compare the self-reported amount
for the study account with the correct amount in the account, which we know from administrative data,
and nd a correlation of merely 0.43.
17Conrming the validity of this measure, we test whether participants in the Peer Group Treatment
reported a higher probability of having made a deposit into the study account, which we know from the
administrative data to be true, and nd that this is indeed the case (p < 0:01).
15for individuals in the Peer Group Treatment than for those with access to the basic or
high interest account. Taken together, this evidence suggests that the savings in our eld
experiment seem to be additional rather than mere substitution.
4 How Crucial are Meetings and Peer Pressure?
The previous section established that the self-help peer group meetings are eective at
increasing savings. As mentioned above, such peer group programs consist of a whole bun-
dle of interventions. To understand whether there might be alternative ways to deliver the
service that peer groups provide, it is important to unpack some of these mechanisms to
learn which elements are required for the eectiveness (Ludwig et al., 2011). This section
therefore makes a step towards distinguishing some of these elements by investigating the
importance of two of its key elements: physical meetings and peer pressure. We rst
analyze whether in-person meetings (and all the related activities such as distribution of
stickers, diplomas, moral support, etc.) are required, by testing the eectiveness of reg-
ular feedback and follow-up in \synthetic" peer groups through text messages. We then
investigate whether peer pressure is the driving force, by comparing two dierent types
of feedback message treatments.
The Eect of Feedback Text Messages on Savings
Figure 3 shows the impact of being oered the weekly text message feedback service.
The horizontal axis represents months since the treatment began in the year 2009, and
the area between the vertical lines marks the period during which the text message in-
tervention was implemented (called \intervention period" going forward). Panel A shows
the number of deposits per month, and Panel B shows the amount deposited.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 reveals three important points. First, there is no signicant dierence be-
tween treatment and control groups in both panels before the experiment begins in August
2009 (month \1" in the gure). Deposits in June and July trend slightly downward in the
cold winter months in Chile, but this trend is no dierent between treatment and control.
Second, during the intervention period, savings outcomes are substantially higher in the
16treatment compared to the control group, almost tripling the number of weekly deposits.
The amounts deposited are more noisy, but even there we see a substantial increase.
Third, after the text messages stop, the savings behavior looks very similar again across
groups, and we observe no long-run impact on savings habits.
Also, in contrast to the self-help peer groups, the eect of the text messages does not
seem to decay over the three treatment months.18 This might be due to the fact that the
default with respect to continuing participation is dierent: In order to stop participating
in the text message service, individuals would have to actively opt out, while for the peer
group support to continue, participants have to actively opt in each week by attending
the meeting. The eect of text messages might therefore be more sustainable over time.
Future research is required to test the eectiveness of the messages over the long run.
In order to estimate the signicance of the treatment eects, we run regressions of
the following form:
Si =  + 1Treatmenti + Prior Savingsi + i (2)
where Si is the savings outcome for individual i, and Treatment is a dummy vari-
able equal to one for individuals in the treatment groups. In addition, we control for
the amount saved prior to the intervention period, which reduces much of the noise by
capturing individual-specic variation, similar to what would be the case in a dierence-
in-dierence specication.19 We use the following measures of Si: (1) total number of
deposits, (2) total amount deposited, and (3) net new savings (deposits-withdrawals) in
the intervention period. Amounts are also shown winsorized at the top 1% and top 5%.
Table 4 presents the results for all three outcomes during the intervention period.
Panel A shows Intent-to-Treat (ITT) and Panel B Treatment-on-the-Treated (TOT) ef-
fects.20 The feedback text messages have a substantial eect on savings. In the ITT
specication, the average number of deposits is almost three times that of the control
group, and the amount deposited is about 6,000 pesos higher. Overall, participants in
the treatment group increase their savings balance in the intervention period by about
18This can be seen more clearly in gure C1 in the Appendix, which represents weeks since a given
participant started the treatment.
19Results without controlling for prior balance (shown in Table C2 in the appendix) are qualitatively
similar but measured more imprecisely.
20Since the treatments are stratied across groups, clustering standard errors at the group level does
not aect the results.
177,800 pesos.21 Take-up rates of the two treatments are very similar. Of participants who
initially express interest in the service, 42.8% end up signing up when oered the Savings
Buddy service and 41.6% when oered the Peer Information service.22 Correspondingly,
the TOT eects are somewhat more than double in size, increasing amounts deposited
nearly 6-fold in the full sample and 3.4-fold in the winsorized sample. To put these num-
bers in perspective, Karlan et al. (2010) nd that in a pooled sample from Peru, Bolivia
and the Philippines, monthly savings reminders in increased savings by 6%.
[Table 4 about here.]
With respect to the relationship of the Feedback Message Experiment with the pre-
ceding Peer Group Experiment, two questions arise. 1) Is there an interaction eect of
having been in the peer group treatment on the eectiveness of the Feedback Message
Treatment? 2) How do the magnitudes of the Peer Group and Text Message treatments
compare? With respect to the rst question, analysis of interaction terms between treat-
ments in the two experiments shows no signicant eect of having been in the Peer Group
Treatment on take-up or eectiveness of the Feedback Message treatments. With respect
to the second question, comparison of the treatment eects between the two experiments
(self-help peer groups versus feedback messages) clearly has to be interpreted with much
caution, since it is not based on random assignment. The treatment happens in a dif-
ferent year, to a dierent subsample of participants, and over a dierent length of time.
However, a back-of-the-envelope calculation allows us to get some sense on how much of
the eect of self-help peer groups can be achieved without physical meetings.
First, we need to take into account that participants in the Feedback Message Ex-
periment are a non-random subsample of the Peer Group Experiment, namely those who
opened an account in the scope of the rst experiment, own a cellphone, and expressed
interest in a text message service to help them save more. We therefore recalculate the
eect of self-help peer groups among only those 873 participants. To further increase
comparability, we hold the duration constant and focus on the initial period, when the
21The coecient on prior savings is negative, since mechanically, people who have prior savings can
withdraw more in the intervention period, leading to possible negative new savings. The net new savings
of zero in the control group correspondingly indicates that participants in this group withdrew the same
amount as they deposited. We also test whether the eect of the Feedback Message Experiment varies
by treatment in Experiment 1 and nd no signicant dierences.
22Take-up was not signicantly dierent for those who had previously received the peer group treatment
than for those who had received the basic account (35.7 vs. 39.6% respectively). Take-up was highest
(53.5%) among those in the high interest treatment.
18Peer Group Treatment had the strongest eect. This stacks the odds in favor of the Peer
Group Treatment, and therefore provides a conservative estimate for the hypothesis that
physical meetings are less important than expected. It also has the advantage of control-
ling for seasonal eects, since it compares savings in the same calendar months one year
apart. Table C3 in the Appendix shows this specication and indicates a treatment eect
of 10,058 pesos for the Peer Group Treatment among this sample.
Finally, TOT and ITT for the Peer Group Experiment are by construction identical in
this sample, since all participants in the Feedback Message Experiment opened a savings
account in the scope of the Peer Group Experiment. For a conservative comparison, we
therefore compare it with the ITT eect of the Feedback Message Experiment in Table 4,
where savings increase by about 8,000 pesos.23 This back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests that feedback text messages can achieve 80% or more of the eect of self-help
peer groups in terms of new savings balance, and implies that physical meetings might
not be as central to the eect of self-help peer groups as previously thought.
In sum, feedback text messages provide an alternative delivery mechanism to self-
help peer groups that has a substantial eect on savings and is potentially more scalable.
They strip the bundle of interventions used in self-help peer groups of many elements and
thereby provide a rst step towards understanding the underlying mechanism of peers as
commitment device.
Is Peer Pressure Required for the Eectiveness?
The previous section established that peer-related feedback text messages can achieve
substantial increases in savings rates without actual in-person meetings. This section
investigates whether the eect can also be achieved without peer pressure, by comparing
the two types of feedback message treatments (see Section 2 for a description of their
design).
Figure 4 shows the ITT eect of the Peer Pressure Treatment compared to both
the control group and the Peer Information Treatment. The savings behavior in the two
treatments follows a very similar pattern, both in terms of the number of deposits per
month (Panel A) and in terms of amount deposited (Panel B).24
23If we choose the specication that does not control for prior balance, shown in Table C2, then the
benchmark eect of the text messages is even higher, at 10,000 pesos.
24The gures seem to suggest that there is a dierent time trend between the two treatments. However,
the monthly graphs based on the overall intervention period are not ideal for observing time trends, since
19[Figure 4 about here.]
Table 5 conrms this impression with regressions. Both treatments independently
increase savings compared to the control group (statistically signicantly for all three
outcomes except net new savings in the Peer Pressure Treatment). When comparing the
eects of the two treatments with an F-test, having a Savings Buddy has no substantially
dierent eect on any of the three outcome variables.
[Table 5 about here.]
The fact that the Peer Pressure Treatment does not lead to stronger eects is even
more striking in light of a) the kind of person participants chose as their Savings Buddy
and b) the information contained in the Peer Information messages.
a) When signing up for the text message service, participants in the Peer Pressure
Treatment indicate their relationship to the Savings Buddy and the main reason they
chose that person. Participants are allowed to select their own Savings Buddy so that they
can choose their \optimal" peer. The reasons given for choosing that particular person
indeed indicate that participants are using the text message services as a peer pressure
commitment device and select Savings Buddies who really hold them accountable. The
most frequently stated reason (31%) is that the person chosen is very strict and will
motivate the participant to comply with his or her savings goal (see Table C4 in the
Appendix). This is followed by 29% indicating that the person was chosen because the
participant generally shares nancial information with them; 19% because the person is a
role model when it comes to saving, by being very organized and good at complying with
his or her own savings goals; and 12% because the participant shares a bank account with
that person. Very few participants (5%) indicate that they chose their Savings Buddy
for being a relaxed person who would be understanding if the participant could not reach
their savings goal.
In terms of their relationship to their Savings Buddy, participants tend to choose
someone who is close to them, either a close relative or a close friend. The most common
choice is a son or daughter (32%), followed by partner (25%), close friend (17%), other
relative (14%), parent (6%), neighbor (2%), and someone else (3%). According to Mas
participants joined the treatment in dierent weeks. When looking at a graph representing weeks since
the start of treatment for a given participant (shown in Figure C1 in the Appendix), the two treatments
look very similar over time.
20and Moretti (2009), peer pressure can be expected to be particularly strong if the peers
know each other, have had past interactions, and expect future interaction. Similarly,
research by Ferrara (2003) and Karlan (2007) shows that in peer lending groups, close
social connections can reduce default. This would suggest that the selected peers should be
particularly eective. However, we cannot rule out that in our context, the optimal social
distance is dierent, for example if close peers are too understanding when a commitment
is not reached and therefore less likely to exert pressure.
b) One possible explanation as to why the Peer Pressure Treatment does not have
a stronger eect than the Peer Information Treatment could be that the peer pressure
eect is strong, but the eect of the information about the performance of others is
equally strong. While we cannot rule out that this could be the case, the nature of
the information that was conveyed suggests that this is not very likely. The message in
the Peer Information Treatment (see text in Appendix A) informs participants about the
percentage of others similar to them that made a deposit in a given week. It turns out that
in most weeks, that number is very low or even zero (on average, they are informed that
6% of their peers followed through with their goals). This fact, combined with evidence
from Beshears et al. (2009) showing that such information may have very limited eects
on savings, suggests that the peer information component is not very likely to have had
a strong eect.25
In sum, we nd that feedback text messages are eective even without a savings
buddy and that peer pressure is not required. This not only makes them less cumbersome
to implement and scale, it also avoids the potential disutility from social pressure, which
can make participants potentially worse o (e.g., DellaVigna et al., 2012).
5 Benchmarking the Eect of Peer Groups against
that of a High Interest Rate
The results so far show that self-help peer groups can be a powerful tool to increase savings
{ even if the mechanism might be more due to feedback and follow-up than through peer
pressure. We now compare this behavioral intervention to a more traditional incentive
25We also analyzed whether the treatment eect of the Peer Information Treatment is dierent for those
who have been randomly assigned to dierent quality peers, but did not nd any signicant dierences
(for details, see Footnote 11).
21to increase savings, an increased interest rate. This section compares the eect of self-
help peer groups to the High Interest Rate Treatment in which the real interest rate was
increase to 5% annually, instad of the 0.3% in the basic and peer group accounts.
In addition to serving as a benchmark for the Peer Group Treatment, the high interest
rate account allows us to test the impact of the interest rate on savings. This setting
provides a particularly strong test, since in the context of this experiment, the higher
interest rate was made exceptionally salient, including an entire training session that
elaborated this point (see Section 2). In many other contexts, the interest is likely to be
even less impactful, since participants may be less aware of it.
While from a theoretical perspective, an argument could be made that the overall
eect of interest rates on savings is ambiguous, due to the income eect that could po-
tentially dominate the substitution eect26, the prediction on the substitution eect is
clear: In the absence of signicant transaction costs, individuals should reallocate their
savings portfolio towards the higher-return account. In our setting, we have the ability
not only to look at the overall eect of the interest rate on savings, but also at whether
participants who had pre-existing savings move them to the high interest account. Since
the 5% interest rate is higher than anything else oered in the market for these popula-
tions, we know that their pre-existing savings must have a lower return. If the interest
rate does not even lead to such reallocation of the savings portfolio to the account with
the highest return, policies and theories based on the premise that the interest rate is an
eective tool to steer savings may have to be called into question to some degree, at least
for this type of population.
[Figure 5 about here]
Figure 5 shows the mean monthly savings balance as well as the 75th, 95th, and 99th
percentiles.27 Looking at the mean, it is not readily apparent whether the savings balance
diers between the High-Interest Treatment and either the Peer Group Treatment or the
basic account. However, Panels B-D show that looking at the whole distribution reveals
a much starker result. The vast majority of participants do not respond to the increased
interest rate at all. At the 75th and even at the 95th percentile, the savings balance in the
basic account and the High-Interest Treatment are virtually identical, while participants
26In practice, the income eect is likely to be less important for shorter-term precautionary savings,
such as those in this study.
27The median is zero, given that take-up is only about 50%.
22in the Peer Group Treatment display substantially higher savings. Only at the very top
of the distribution (Panel D for the 99th percentile) does the interest rate lead to higher
savings. In sum, Figure 5 indicates that self-help peer groups shift the entire distribution
of savings, while the increased interest rate only aects the very top tail of the savings
distribution.
The results of Table 3 support those ndings in regressions for all three of our savings
outcomes. The Peer Group Treatment not only leads to a much bigger increase in the
number of deposits than the High-Interest Treatment, but also to a substantially higher
balance. The treatment eect on the balance is almost twice as large overall, and almost
eight times larger when we winsorize the top 5%. Consistent with the graphical evi-
dence above, the dierence only becomes statistically insignicant in the non-winsorized
specication. If we take the results from Column (5) and linearly extrapolate the point
estimation of the interest rate increase, the results suggest that the self-help peer groups
have an eect equivalent to an increase in the interest rate of 7.8%.
The fact that an increase in the interest rate of almost ve percentage points has no
impact on savings for most participants is noteworthy. We next investigate whether those
participants who had substantial pre-existing savings reallocate them to the higher-yield
account. When asked in the follow-up survey, less than 1% indicate having made any
transfers from a pre-existing account into their study account. Since for small amounts
of savings, the transaction costs may be too large to warrant reallocation, we also split
the group of those with pre-existing accounts further in two, and focus on those with
above-median pre-existing balance. Interestingly, even these `high pre-treatment savers'
do not shift their savings towards the high-interest account. While their average balance
in the pre-existing accounts is about 315,000 pesos (or about 650 USD), their savings in
the study accounts are only about 15,000 pesos.28
There are many potential explanations: tangible or mental costs associated with
this transaction, limited liquidity of the alternative account, a lack of understanding of
the interest rate, mental accounting, or reasons other than the interest rate that lead
participants to prefer the alternative bank account. Determining the specic reasons goes
beyond the scope of this paper. However, we elicited some qualitative information through
a series of detailed questions in the follow-up survey about the motives for moving or not
moving money from other accounts. Two aspects stand out in the survey responses: a
28Similarly, but less surprisingly, we do not observe a shift for those with below-median pre-existing
savings. Their average balance is 40,000 pesos in the pre-existing account and 3,000 in the study account.
23lack of understanding of the interest rate and mental accounting (Thaler, 1990). There is
also some indication that this might be less the case for those with higher education and
nancial literacy. For a full tabulation and more detailed discussion of these descriptive
results, see Appendix B.
In sum, the comparison between the Peer Group Treatment and the High Interest
Rate Treatment suggests that a behavioral intervention is more eective in this setting
in that it increases savings for a much larger part of the population than increasing the
nancial incentives to save. In addition, even participants who have pre-existing formal
savings with lower rates of return do not reallocate their savings to the higher-return
account, suggesting a very limited role of the interest rate for savings decisions.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Peer groups are often used as a commitment device to achieve personal goals, but there has
been little empirical evidence evaluating their eectiveness and analyzing what aspects
lead to their success. Our ndings that self-help peer groups increase the number of
deposits 3.7-fold, and almost double the average savings balance after a year, show that
these groups can be a powerful tool to help participants reach an individual but mutually
shared goal. Beyond savings, this mechanism is applicable for a wide area of self-control
problems.
Self-help peer groups may be particularly eective in areas where a small behavior
change can generate a large impact. This is for example the case in our context of pre-
cautionary savings, where the relatively small magnitudes in dollar amounts (about 15
USD) can have large implications for participants' quality of life. The income stream
of these populations is not only low, but also highly volatile. Correspondingly, prior to
the intervention, many participants expressed the desire to build a buer stock against
economic shocks, and frustration about their inability to do so on their own. This can
have large implications, as having a small cushion on the side can for example make the
dierence between paying the utility bill or sleeping in the cold during the freezing Chilean
winter.29
Adding a savings peer group component is especially convenient in contexts where
29In line with this, Kast and Pomeranz (2013) nd that after one year, participants in the Peer Group
Treatment are signicantly less anxious about their nancial future.
24people meet regularly anyway, such as micronance groups, schools, sports clubs, or
churches. The Feedback Message Experiment suggests that even outside of such contexts,
savings can be strongly increased by holding people accountable through simple feedback
messages. While self-help peer group meetings can be cumbersome to set up and to
maintain, text message services require little coordination and do not rely on physical
proximity, making them more broadly applicable. Given the astonishing growth rate of
cell phone use worldwide, this is a channel that can potentially reach millions of people
and may be attractive to a wider and dierent population than those who are willing to
come together for regular meetings.
In addition, the Feedback Message Experiment makes a rst step towards disentan-
gling the mechanism of self-help peer groups as a commitment device. The fact that
regular Feedback Messages are surprisingly eective even without physical meetings and
without a Savings Buddy that observes participants' behavior, suggests the hypothesis
that rather than exerting pressure, participants may simply provide a mutual service to
regularly hold each other accountable. This interpretation raises at least four additional
research questions: 1) How important is the feedback element, and would simple reminders
(Karlan et al., 2010) have a similar eect? 2) Could other types of Savings Buddies than
the ones chosen by the participants (e.g., in terms of social distance, personality traits,
etc.) be more eective at holding them accountable? 3) Does the peer information have
a motivational eect after all, despite the fact that participants are informed that only
few others are making a deposit each week? 4) How generalizable are these ndings to
other settings?
Beyond the issue of savings, feedback and follow-up through text messages have
many potential applications in other areas where people make resolutions but nd it dif-
cult to follow through, such as preventive health measures (e.g., for diabetes, exercising,
or vaccinations), environmentally-friendly behavior (e.g., saving energy), education (e.g.,
completing homework, solving math exercises), etc. As these methods nd wider applica-
tion, the question arises to what degree multiple feedback messages crowd out attention,
and further research is required to investigate interactions between multiple messages, as
well as the eect of feedback messages over a longer time period.
The analysis of the interest rate serves as a benchmark for the eectiveness of the
Peer Group Treatment. In addition, the absence of an eect of the interest rate for most
participants is of interest by itself. While further research is needed to understand whether
this might be a more general result, it suggests that some caution is warranted in the use
25of policies or economic models that assume large shares of the population will respond to
changes in the interest rate.
Finally, our results speak to a larger point about behavioral interventions versus
nancial incentives to aect behavior. A growing pattern of evidence shows the im-
portance of social incentives (e.g., Bandiera et al., 2010; Barankay, 2010; Gneezy and
Rey-Biel, 2014) and surprisingly limited eects of monetary rewards, even for nancial
decisions (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2011; Choi et al., 2010; Karlan and Zinman, 2013). Our
nding of strong eects of self-help peer groups and feedback messages, compared to the
limited eectiveness of the interest rate, ts into this pattern. This is consistent with a
new and rapidly growing literature that uses eld experiments to directly compare social
and behavioral interventions with nancial incentives (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2010; Ashraf
et al., 2012; Chetty et al., 2013). While traditional economic incentives may be eective
in contexts where individuals lack motivation, they may have limited impact if the con-
straint that impedes the behavior change lies elsewhere.30 Implementing behavior change
can be challenging even for motivated individuals { either psychologically, due for exam-
ple to self-control problems, or practically, due for example to complicated processes. In
these situations, policies that facilitate compliance may be more eective than policies
that further increase incentives.
30We thank Brigitte Madrian for helpful discussions, which allowed us to see our ndings in this light.
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Figure 1: Timeline and Sampling Procedure
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Figure 2: Eect of Self-Help Peer Groups on Savings (Experiment 1)
Notes: Panel A shows the number of deposits in a given month. Panel B shows the average balance in
the study accounts. `Month' indicates the months since the start of the experiment. All amounts are in
Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD.
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Figure 3: Eect of Feedback Text Messages on Savings (Experiment 2)
Notes: Panel A shows the monthly number of deposits and Panel B the amount deposited, winsorized
at the top 5%. The experiment started in August (month 1) and ended in October 2009 (month 3). All
amounts are in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD.
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Figure 4: Impact of Peer Pressure through a Savings Buddy (Experiment 2)
Notes: Panel A shows the monthly number of deposits and Panel B the amount deposited, winsorized
at the top 5%. The experiment started in August (month 1) and ended in October 2009 (month 3). All
amounts are in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD.
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Figure 5: Eect of Self-Help Peer Groups and High Interest (Experiment 1)
Notes: Panel A shows the average balance in the study accounts. Panel B, C and D show the 75th, 95th
and 99th percentile, respectively. `Month' indicates the months since the start of the experiment. All
amounts are in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD.
35Table 1: Summary Statistics and Balance of Randomization (Experiment 1)
All Control Dierence \Peer Dierence \High
Accounts Group" - Control Interest" - Control
Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Education 9.65 9.59 0.057 0.132
(3.06) (3.01) (0.21) (0.24)
Age 43.39 43.49 0.10 -0.64
(11.58) (11.70) (0.71) (0.84)
Income per capita (monthly) 80,519 80,187 335 615
(58,901) (55,308) (3,535) (4,730)
[67,375] [67,166] [1,167] [-1,000]
Household size 4.33 4.42 -0.14 -0.07
(1.75) (1.82) (0.12) (0.14)
Has pre-study savings account 0.33 0.35 -0.03 -0.02
(0.47) (0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Savings balance in other accounts 68,980 80,087 -13,592 -15,252
(290,316) (430,749) (18,038) (18,143)
[0] [0] [0] [0]
Financial debt 287,326 464,643 -201,953 -277,172
(2,227,464) (4,557,721) (198,479) (197,127)
[66,000] [55,800] [15,200] [7,850]
Group size 14.80 13.52 1.58** 1.73**
(3.92) (3.68) (0.72) (0.81)
Number of observations 2,687 571
Notes: In Columns (1)-(2), standard deviations are presented in parentheses below group means and medians are
presented in brackets. Columns (3)-(4) show the dierence between treatment and control groups by regressing
the variable of interest on treatment dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at the group level are shown
in parentheses and medians in brackets. Monetary gures in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD.
Level of signicance: *p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01.
36Table 2: Summary Statistics and Balance of Randomization (Experiment 2)
All Control Dierence \Peer Dierence \Peer
Accounts Pressure"- Control Information" - Control
Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Education 9.72 9.65 0.07 0.15
(3.02) (3.06) (0.25) (0.25)
Age 43.90 44.05 -1.03 0.58
(10.89) (10.78) (0.90) (0.90)
Income per capita (monthly) 82,590 84,519 -2,911 -2,939
(69,475) (92,483) (5,766) (5,776)
[70,000] [67,500] [2,750] [167]
Household size 4.38 4.39 0.11 -0.15
(1.69) (1.58) (0.14) (0.14)
Has pre-study savings account 0.34 0.30 0.07 0.03
(0.47) (0.46) (0.03) (0.04)
Savings balance in study account (Jul 09) 12,733 14,853 -2,887 -3,543
(104,259) (152,427) (8,616) (8,646)
[1,130] [2,000] [0] [-1,000]
Financial debt (Jul 09) 162,864 156,924 14,089 3,844
(407,267) (408,098) (33,657) (33,776)
[36,500] [38,000] [-6,524] [3,000]
Number of prior deposits in study account
(Aug 08-Jul 09) 1.51 1.50 -0.02 0.06
(3.81) (3.88) (0.31) (0.32)
Number of prior withdrawals from study account
(Aug 08-Jul 09) 0.69 0.68 0.01 0.04
(1.49) (1.40) (0.12) (0.12)
Number of observations 873 297
Notes: In Columns (1)-(2), standard deviations are presented in parentheses below group means and medians are presented in
brackets. Columns (3)-(4) show the dierence between treatment and control groups, by regressing the variable of interest on
treatment dummies. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and medians in brackets. Monetary amounts in Chilean
pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of signicance: *p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01.
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7Table 3: The Eect of Self-Help Groups on Savings
Dependent variable: # of Deposits Amount Deposited Average Monthly Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Intent-to-Treat
Self-Help Peer Groups 0.835*** 14,183*** 7,826*** 3,286*** 4,050** 2,227** 1,817***
(0.162) (5,363) (2,830) (772) (1,888) (861) (392)
High Interest Account 0.060 12,615* 5,655 371 2,446 526 232
(0.104) (6,964) (3,642) (786) (1,810) (984) (368)
Constant 0.305*** 10,371*** 9,184*** 2,960*** 4,419*** 3,951*** 2,193***
(0.071) (2,552) (1,963) (528) (930) (673) (269)
Winsorized None None Top 1% Top 5% None Top 1% Top 5%
R2 0.022 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.001 0.004 0.017
F-test `Self-Help' = `High Interest' p = 0:00 p = 0:85 p = 0:56 p = 0:00 p = 0:48 p = 0:06 p = 0:00
Panel B: Treatment on the (Instrumented) Treated
Self-Help Peer Groups 1.528*** 25,936*** 14,312*** 6,009*** 7,407** 4,073*** 3,323***
(0.277) (9,636) (5,041) (1,336) (3,405) (1,527) (664)
High Interest Account 0.118 24,887* 11,155 732 4,826 1,040 458
(0.204) (13,756) (7,103) (1,540) (3,566) (1,925) (710)
Constant 0.305*** 10,371*** 9,184*** 2,960*** 4,419*** 3,951*** 2,193***
(0.071) (2,544) (1,957) (526) (928) (671) (268)
Winsorized None None Top 1% Top 5% None Top 1% Top 5%
F-test `Self-Help' = `High Interest' p = 0:00 p = 0:95 p = 0:65 p = 0:00 p = 0:54 p = 0:07 p = 0:00
Number of observations 2,687 2,687 2,687 2,687 2,687 2,687 2,687
Notes: Dependent variables: Total number of deposits in Column (1); Total amount deposited in Columns (2)-(4); Average balance per
month in Columns (5)-(7). Coecients of OLS regressions in Panel A and coecients of two-stage least squares in Panel B. Standard errors
clustered at the group level in parentheses. All monetary gures in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of signicance:
*p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01
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8Table 4: The Eect of Feedback Text Messages on Savings
Dependent variable: # of Deposits Amount Deposited Net New Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Intent-to-Treat
Treatment Group 0.270*** 5,939** 3,508** 1,176*** 7,846* 6,845** 6,580**
(0.093) (2,778) (1,465) (444) (4,244) (3,420) (3,315)
Prior Balance 0.000** 0.135*** 0.058*** 0.012*** -0.678*** -0.714*** -0.719***
(0.000) (0.013) (0.007) (0.002) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant 0.124 844 1,690 988*** -262 -382 -1,197
(0.076) (2,266) (1,195) (363) (3,462) (2,790) (2,704)
Winsorized None None Top 1% Top 5% None Top 1% Top 5%
R2 0.015 0.120 0.085 0.046 0.588 0.709 0.724
Panel B: Treatment on the (Instrumented) Treated
Treated 0.639*** 14,050** 8,299** 2,781*** 18,560* 16,193** 15,566**
(0.215) (6,533) (3,440) (1,035) (10,066) (8,147) (7,908)
Prior Balance 0.000** 0.136*** 0.058*** 0.012*** -0.677*** -0.713*** -0.718***
(0.000) (0.013) (0.007) (0.002) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant 0.124* 834 1,684 986*** -274 -393 -1,207
(0.074) (2,256) (1,188) (357) (3,476) (2,814) (2,731)
(0.025) (752) (396) (119) (3,476) (2,814) (2,731)
Winsorized None None Top 1% Top 5% None Top 1% Top 5%
Control Group Mean 0.139 2,853 2,549 1,167 -10,316 -10,975 -11,858
Number of observations 873 873 873 873 873 873 873
Notes: Dependent variables: Total number of deposits in Column (1); Total amount deposited in Columns (2)-(4); Net new
savings (amount deposited - amount withdrawn) in Columns (5)-(7). All outcomes are for the intervention period from August
to October 2009. Coecients of OLS regressions in Panel A and coecients of two-stage least squares in Panel B. All monetary
gures in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of signicance: *p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01
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9Table 5: Comparing the Eects of Peer Pressure and Peer Information
Dependent variable: # of Deposits Amount Deposited Net New Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Peer Pressure 0.261** 6,054* 4,181** 1,267** 5,720 5,599 5,517
(0.107) (3,209) (1,692) (513) (4,901) (3,951) (3,829)
Peer Information 0.281*** 5,882* 2,868* 1,100** 9,881** 7,976** 7,514*
(0.107) (3,221) (1,698) (515) (4,919) (3,965) (3,843)
Prior Balance 0.000** 0.135*** 0.058*** 0.012*** -0.678*** -0.714*** -0.719***
(0.000) (0.013) (0.007) (0.002) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant 0.124 831 1,680 983*** -213 -331 -1,142
(0.076) (2,263) (1,193) (362) (3,457) (2,786) (2,701)
Winsorized None None Top 1% Top 5% None Top 1% Top 5%
R2 0.015 0.120 0.086 0.047 0.588 0.709 0.724
F-test `Pressure' = `Information' p = 0:85 p = 0:96 p = 0:44 p = 0:75 p = 0:40 p = 0:55 p = 0:61
Number of Observations 873 873 873 873 873 873 873
Notes: Dependent variables: Total number of deposits in Column (1); Total amount deposited in Columns (2)-(4); Net new savings
(amount deposited - amount withdrawn) in Columns (5)-(7). All outcomes are for the intervention period from August to October 2009.
All monetary gures in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of signicance: *p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01
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0APPENDIX FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
A Text messages (English translation)
Peer Pressure Treatment
 Messages to participants:
{ In case of deposit
\Congratulations! Last week you made your weekly deposit and we just
informed your Savings Buddy of your achievement."
{ In case of failure to deposit
\Ooh! Last week you did not achieve your weekly deposit and we just informed
your Savings Buddy."
 Messages to Savings Buddy:
{ In case of deposit by the participant
\Good news, last week [NAME OF PARTICIPANT] made his/her weekly
deposit. Thanks for being his/her Savings Buddy!"
{ In case of failure to deposit
\Unfortunately last week [NAME OF PARTICIPANT] did not make his/her
weekly deposit. Thanks for being his/her Savings Buddy!"
Peer Information Treatment
 In case of deposit
\Congratulations! Last week you made your weekly deposit. [PERCENT OF OTH-
ERS]% of other participants similar to you made a deposit."
 In case of failure to deposit
\Ooh! Last week you did not achieve your weekly deposit. [PERCENT OF OTH-
ERS]% of other participants similar to you made a deposit."
41B Survey Evidence on Lack of Savings Reallocation
As discussed in Section 5, even participants with substantial pre-existing savings do not
reallocate them into the high-interest account. To get a sense of what the underlying
reasons might be, we asked participants a series of detailed questions in the follow-up
survey.
Two aspects stand out among the answers: A lack of understanding of the interest
rate, and mental accounting. Concerning the former, only 2% of participants indicate
knowing the interest rate in their other account. Despite that, 63% of those in the High-
Interest Treatment claim that their other savings account has a higher interest rate which,
as discussed above, is not only unlikely, but also surprising given that participants were
made aware in several ways when the accounts were introduced that the high-interest
account oers the highest return in the market.
This raises the question to what degree nancial literacy or lack of schooling could
be at the source of these ndings. There is some indication that nancial sophistication
might interact with the treatments. For those with above-median nancial literacy31 or
above-median education, the High-Interest Treatment leads to statistically signicantly
higher overall savings than the basic account, while for the overall population it does not
(controlling for socio-demographic characteristics). However, the dierence between the
subgroups is not signicant.
Mental accounting stands out when participants are asked directly for their reasons
not to transfer money from their other account into the high-interest account. After
soliciting information from participants about the characteristics of the two accounts
(with respect to the interest rate, distance, withdrawal restrictions, trust in the bank,
friendliness of bank sta, and understandability of the account conditions), we asked
those who had another account to categorize a list of potential reasons, in terms of their
importance for not making any transfers. As seen in Table B1, mental accounting is
named as very important by far the most frequently.
31We use three nancial literacy questions similar to the ones used in, e.g., Banks and Oldeld (2007);
Gerardi et al. (2013).
42Table B1: Reasons Not to Transfer Money into High-Interest Account
Mental accounting (\Because the alternative account is destined towards a
specic goal that I do not want to mix with the other savings account")
70%
Distance (\The other bank is closer") 19%
Uncertainty (\Because I am not sure whether the favorable conditions of the
account in the study will continue")
18%
Trust (\The other bank is more trustworthy") 18%
Interest rate (\The other account has a higher interest rate") 17%
Cost of withdrawing and redepositing 10%
Having an outstanding loan at the other bank 9%
Notes: Table shows percentage of individuals among those who did not transfer money into the
high-interest account who indicated this reason as \very important".
43C Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure C1: Feedback Message Treatments, Weeks Since Participation Start
Notes: The gure shows the development of the probability of making a weekly deposit over time. While
Figures 3 and 4 show the treatment eects over the intervention period, this gure displays the eect
since the week a given participant started participating in the experiment. Since not all individuals were
surveyed at the same time, they did not start receiving messages at the same time. The development
over time in Figures 3 and 4 therefore combines both a varying share of treated participants and with
potential changes of the treatment eect over time. This gure graphically displays the treatment eects
of the Peer Pressure Treatment vs. the Peer Information Treatment over time. It includes individuals
who participated at least 10 weeks in the study.
44Table C1: Time Inconsistencies (Peer Group Experiment)
Dependent variable: # of Deposits Average Monthly Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time Inconsistenta  Self-Help 0.573** 0.603** 654 976 2,627 2,820*
(0.290) (0.297) (3,028) (2,870) (1,595) (1,601)
Time Inconsistenta  High-Interest 0.322* 0.314* 3,942 5,702* 2,836* 3,325*
(0.194) (0.190) (3,374) (3,279) (1,707) (1,804)
Time Inconsistent -0.010 0.013 -2,100 -1,963 -1,454 -1,359
(0.114) (0.114) (1,398) (1,369) (1,141) (1,159)
Self-Help Peer Groups 0.653*** -0.910 3,930 -11,100 1,451 -8,201
(0.157) (0.767) (2,653) (8,526) (1,014) (5,833)
High-Interest Rate -0.052 -0.241 1,225 -4,547 -356 -2,820
(0.100) (0.570) (2,193) (11,266) (1,125) (7,814)
Constant 0.308*** 0.874*** 5,000*** 10,823** 4,353*** 7,989***
(0.075) (0.334) (1,189) (4,238) (810) (3,056)
Control variables (and interactions) No Yes No Yes No Yes
Winsorized None None None None Top 1% Top 1%
R2 0.028 0.039 0.001 0.010 0.005 0.028
Number of observations 2,687 2,542 2,687 2,542 2,687 2,542
Notes: Dependent variables: Total number of deposits in Columns (1) and (2); Total amount deposited in Columns
(3) - (6). Control variables (fully interacted with the treatment dummies) are: education, age, household size,
initial household income, nancial debt, last recorded amount of credit with FE, and bank savings. Standard errors
clustered at the group level in parentheses. All monetary gures in Chilean pesos. 500 pesos = approximately 1
USD. Level of signicance: *p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01
aTime inconsistency is measured by giving survey participants choices between x pesos in time t and y pesos (x < y)
in time t+1 month (similar to e.g., Ashraf et al. (2006b) and Meier and Sprenger (2010)). Individuals make those
choices for t = today and t = six months from today, which allows us to categorize individuals as being time
inconsistent, i.e. present biased, if they are more impatient when t = today than when t = 6 months. Using this
denition, about 30% of participants are classied as time inconsistent.
4
5Table C2: The Eect of Feedback Text Messages on Savings (Without Controlling for \Prior Balance")
Dependent variable: # of Deposits Amount Deposited Net New Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Intent-to-Treat
Treatment Group 0.267*** 5,509* 3,324** 1,137** 9,999 9,113 8,863
(0.093) (2,954) (1,526) (453) (6,598) (6,328) (6,301)
Constant 0.139* 2,853 2,549** 1,167*** -10,316* -10,975** -11,858**
(0.076) (2,402) (1,241) (368) (5,365) (5,145) (5,123)
Winsorized None None Top 1% Top 5% None Top 1% Top 5%
R2 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.002
Panel B: Treatment on the (Instrumented) Treated
Treated 0.631*** 13,028* 7,861** 2,690** 23,646 21,551 20,959
(0.215) (6,953) (3,587) (1,056) (15,626) (15,002) (14,944)
Constant 0.139* 2,853 2,549** 1,167*** -10,316* -10,975** -11,858**
(0.074) (2,390) (1,233) (363.202) (5,372) (5,157) (5,138)
Winsorized None None Top 1% Top 5% None Top 1% Top 5%
Number of observations 873 873 873 873 873 873 873
Notes: This table replicates the specication in Table 4 without controlling for \Prior Balance" in their savings account.
Dependent variables: Total number of deposits in Column (1); Total amount deposited (2)-(4); Net new savings (amount
deposited - amount withdrawn) in Columns (5)-(7). All outcomes are for the intervention period from August to October
2009. Coecients of OLS regressions in Panel A and coecients of two-stage least squares in Panel B. All monetary gures
in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = approximately 1 USD. Level of signicance: *p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01
4
6Table C3: Eects of Self-Help Groups for Text Message Sample
Dependent Variables: # Deposits Amount Deposited Net New Savings
(1) (2) (3)
Self-Help Peer Groups 0.864*** 8,121 10,058*
(0.185) (5,250) (5,405)
High Interest Account 0.018 6,868 5,797
(0.104) (4,289) (4,308)
Constant 0.266*** 4,695*** -2,683
(0.077) (1,784) (3,757)
R2 0.052 0.002 0.003
Number of observations 873 873 873
Notes: This table calculates the eects of the Peer Group Experiment for August to
October 2008 among the sample of the 873 participants who also ended up partic-
ipating in the Feedback Message Experiment. Dependent variables: Total number
of deposits in Column (1); Total amount deposited in Column (2); Net new savings
(amount deposited - amount withdrawn) in Column (3). Standard errors clustered at
the group level in parentheses. Monetary gures in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos
= approximately 1 USD. Level of signicance: *p < 0:1, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01
47Table C4: Choice of Savings Buddy
Frequency Percent
Why did you choose your Savings Buddy?
Because my Savings Buddy ...
...and I save together in the same account. 18 12.24
...is very strict and will motivate me to comply with my savings goals. 45 30.61
...is very relaxed and will understand if I do not reach my savings goals. 7 4.76
...is very close to me and I share my nancial information with them. 42 28.57
...is a role model when it comes to savings, very organized and always 28 19.05
complies with their savings goal.
Other 4 2.72
No response 3 2.04
Number of observations 147
What is your relationship to your Savings Buddy?
Partner 37 25.17
Parent 8 5.44
Child 48 32.65
Other relative 20 13.61
Close friend 25 17.01
Neighbor 3 2.04
Other 4 2.72
No response 2 1.36
Number of observations 147
4
8